Incidental Attitude Formation via the Surveillance Task: A Preregistered Replication of Olson and Fazio (2001)

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Abstract

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is one of the most widely-studied procedures for establishing and changing attitudes. The surveillance-task (Olson & Fazio, 2001) is a highly cited EC paradigm, and one that is claimed to generate attitudes without awareness. The potential for EC effects to occur without awareness continues to fuel conceptual, theoretical, and applied developments. Yet few published studies have used this task, and most are characterized by small samples and small effect sizes. We conducted a high-powered (*N* =1478), preregistered close replication of original surveillance-task study. We obtained evidence for a small EC effect when ‘aware’ participants were excluded using the original criterion – therefore replicating the original effect. However, no such effect emerged when three other awareness criteria were used. We suggest that there is a strong need for caution when using evidence for the surveillance task effect to make theoretical and practical claims about ‘unaware’ EC effects.

Keywords: Preregistered Replication; Evaluative Conditioning; Contingency Awareness; Recollective Memory; Attitude Formation

Incidental Attitude Formation via the Surveillance Task: A Preregistered Replication of Olson and Fazio (2001)

Evaluative conditioning (EC) is a widely-studied and highly applicable procedure for establishing and changing attitudes (e.g., De Houwer et al., 2001). In a typical EC task, a neutral (conditioned) stimulus (CS) is repeatedly paired with a positive or negative (unconditioned) stimulus (US), and as a result, the former acquires a similar valence to the latter.

Evaluative conditioning plays a central role in theory and application throughout psychological science. For instance, in its original version, the Associative–Propositional Evaluation (APE) Model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), an influential theory of attitudes in social psychology, distinguished between explicit attitudes and implicit attitudes, and treated EC as a key pathway for changing the latter. The Elaboration-Likelihood Model, in the domain of persuasion (ELM: Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), distinguishes between the central and peripheral routes to persuasion, and views EC as highly relevant to the latter route. Elsewhere, EC is said to play an important role in implicit bias (e.g., Olson & Fazio, 2006), consumption behavior (e.g., Gibson, 2008), self-esteem (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004), disgust (e.g.,Schienle et al., 2001), phobias (e.g., Merckelbach et al., 1993) and many other domains. In the applied domain, it is frequently used as an intervention to address problematic attitudes and behaviors related to addictive substances such as alcohol (e.g., Houben et al., 2010), unhealthy food consumption (e.g., Shaw et al., 2016), and racism (e.g., Lai et al., 2014).

When it comes to theorizing about EC itself, the debate is largely led by proponents of dual process (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006), single process propositional (e.g., De Houwer, 2018), and association formation models (e.g., Jones et al., 2009). Although many variables are used to differentiate between these positions, one has received considerable attention: contingency awareness (e.g., Corneille & Stahl, 2019). Showing that EC effects can occur without contingency awareness is often viewed as supporting dual process and association formation models whereas the opposite is true for propositional models (although see Stahl & Heycke, 2016). So far, the general trend of evidence indicates that EC effects are highly dependent on contingency awareness (e.g., Bar-Anan et al., 2010; Hofmann et al., 2010; Stahl et al., 2009). Yet there is one EC paradigm (Olson & Fazio, 2001) that some argue provides evidence for unaware EC effects (e.g., Jones et al., 2010; March et al., 2018).

This task, commonly called the ‘surveillance procedure’, consists of a stream of (distractor) stimuli and requires participants to detect and respond to target stimuli. Unbeknownst to them, several of the distractor stimuli are actually CS-US pairs. In this way the task requires people to process the CS-US pairs but directs their attention away from those pairings and towards irrelevant target items (Jones et al., 2010). Following training, self-reported (and implicit) evaluations are assessed. Participants are then asked post-hoc questions to gauge if they noticed the CS-US pairings during the surveillance task. If so, these ‘contingency aware’ participants are excluded from subsequent analyses. If not, then EC shown by ‘contingency unaware’ participants is often treated as supporting the idea that EC effects can occur without awareness (e.g., Jones et al., 2009, 2010; March et al., 2018).

Since its introduction in 2001, the surveillance task became one of the most frequently cited EC procedures in the literature (over 700 citations in Google Scholar). Several authors have claimed that the surveillance task provides evidence for unaware EC (e.g., March et al., 2018). They then used these effects to forward conceptual arguments on attitudes in general (i.e., that attitudes can emerge even when people are unaware of their origins), and EC in particular (Walther et al., 2005). For instance, the implicit misattribution theory of EC is based almost exclusively on the task’s findings (Jones et al., 2009). Still others use this task to change existing attitudes, primarily because of its purported implicit effects (e.g., Choi & Lee, 2015; Houben et al., 2010; Olson & Fazio, 2006). Yet others argue that the retrospective measures of contingency knowledge used in this work do not reflect ‘unaware’ EC but instead capture recollective memory for CS-US pairings at the time of judgment rather than awareness of CS-US pairings during encoding (e.g., Gawronski & Walther, 2012).

Regardless of whether one subscribes to the awareness or memory position, constructing theories, and using tasks in applied settings, requires strong evidence. We believe that such evidence is currently lacking. Only a handful of published papers (*n* = 10 reporting 23 separate studies) have actually supported the possibility of EC effects without awareness/recollective memory using the surveillance paradigm. A random-effects meta-analysis of these studies (see [osf.io/4mh2d](https://osf.io/4mh2d/)) reveals a significant but small effect size, Hedges’ *g* = 0.20, 95% CI [0.13, 0.28]. However, features in the distribution of these effect sizes suggest that this small average effect may actually be inflated by publication or reporting biases. For instance, studies with larger standard errors tend to find larger effect sizes (see Figure 1). Such ‘funnel-plot asymmetry’ usually indicates that null results from small studies may be missing from the literature (Sterne et al., 2011). In addition, a meta-analytic selection model assuming publication bias (Vevea & Hedges, 1995) fit the data better than a standard random-effects meta-analysis, χ2(1) = 6.49, *p* = .011, and reveals a non-significant average effect size, Hedges’ *g* = 0.07, 95% CI [-0.006, 0.14]. It is therefore possible that the available evidence of EC effects generated using the surveillance paradigm is biased by the selective publication of significant results.



**Figure 1.** Funnel plot of the data entered into the meta-analysis of previous studies with the surveillance task. Each dot depicts effect size (Hedges’ *g*) against their Standard Errors. Studies falling inside the grey area are statistically non-significant in a two-tailed test. The triangle inside the dashed line is centered at the average mean effect size and represents the distribution of effect sizes that would be expected in the absence of publication bias. The red line represents Egger’s regression test for funnel plot asymmetry.

In short, the surveillance task is argued to provide evidence for EC effects without awareness/recollective memory, is used to advocate for dual-process and association formation models of EC and attitudes, and is often deployed as an intervention to ‘implicitly’ modify problematic attitudes and behavior. Such developments seem premature given that few studies exist, and those that do are characterized by small samples and very small effect sizes. Given the theoretical and practical implications stemming from this task, it seems prudent to replicate the basic effect with a highly powered sample. Doing so will provide a strong constraint on future theorizing about attitudes, EC, and the use of this task in applied contexts.

Towards this end, we contacted the original authors and asked for their assistance in designing a procedure that directly replicated their original (2001) procedure. Rather than directly replicating their original design, the original authors encouraged us to make changes to the study design, based on their own experiences with the task, and on the assumption that this would maximize our chances of obtaining an effect (e.g., March et al., 2018). It is therefore important to note that this study represents a close conceptual replication rather than a direct replication of Olson & Fazio (2001). The final study protocol was approved by the original authors (see [osf.io/wnckg](https://osf.io/wnckg/)). The original authors also recommended that we run the experiment locally in the laboratory rather than on-line. In order to do so, and to collect the necessary sample size, we contacted several labs with extensive expertise with EC to help with data collection. Twelve labs, including the lab of one of the original authors, agreed to contribute to this replication effort.

In addition to replicating the original study, we wanted to explore whether evidence for EC in this task depends on the specific way in which contingency awareness/recollective memory is measured. The original authors’ contingency awareness criterion may have accidentally included individuals who were actually aware of/remembering the contingencies. We therefore included three additional contingency awareness/recollective memory measures that seek to assess this concept in a more conservative manner.

# Disclosures

All materials and analytic files were preregistered before data collection began (see [osf.io/3hjpf](https://osf.io/3hjpf)). All materials, data, analyses, and code are available on the Open Science Framework ([osf.io/hs32y](https://osf.io/hs32y/)). We report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures in the study. Data was collected in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship or the publication of this article. This article represents the consensus opinion among the authors. Given the number of authors involved there are – quite understandably - additional minority opinions that could not be accommodated here.

# Method

## Participants

1478 participants were recruited from twelve labs at ten universities in Europe and North America (72% women, 27% men, < 1% other identity, *Mage* = 21.2 *SD* = 4.9). We initially planned that each lab would collect data from a minimum of 100 participants and a maximum of 150 participants based on their local resources. The rationale for this planned sample size was that in previously published studies the proportion of contingency aware participants ranged from 2% to 27%. Consequently, 1200 participants would allow for greater than 99% power to observe a small EC effect (Cohen’s *d* = 0.20) even if 30% of the sample were subsequently excluded on the basis of contingency awareness/recollective memory.[[1]](#footnote-2) Three labs collected data from more than 150 participants (see the Supplemental Online Material-Reviewed for details on the sample size and characteristics for each lab). One lab collected fewer than 100 participants.[[2]](#footnote-3) All data from all sites was included in the analyses, following our amended preregistration for our data collection stopping rule ([osf.io/uyng7](https://osf.io/uyng7)).

## Materials

**Unconditioned stimuli**. Study materials provided by the original authors were used. Ten positive words, ten negative words, ten positive images, and ten negative images served as the USs. The positive (*Useful, Calming, Desirable, Appealing, Worthwhile, Relaxing, Beneficial, Valuable, Terrific, Commendable*) and negative words (*Inferior, Harmful, Offensive, Troublesome, Upsetting, Terrifying, Unhealthy, Useless, Dislikable, Undesirable*) were identical to those used in Experiment 5 of Jones et al. (2009).[[3]](#footnote-4) The positive and negative images were originally selected from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS: Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997) or the web. However, due to the quality of the original images, we were only able to use nine of the ten positive and nine of the ten negative images from the Jones et al. (2009) study. In consultation with the original authors, we therefore chose two additional IAPS images – one positive and the other negative.

**Conditioned stimuli**. For the conditioned stimuli, the original authors recommended that we not use the CSs from their original (2001) study because these items may be relatively familiar to modern samples (see Jones et al., 2009). Instead they advised us to select stimuli that would be relatively novel and neutral to the sample population. Based on this recommendation we generated a set of sixty Pokémon characters. We pretested these characters along two dimensions (valence and familiarity) using a separate sample of 155 participants on the Prolific Academic website (https://prolific.ac) (see [osf.io/4ecx5](https://osf.io/4ecx5/)). On the basis of this pretest we then selected those twenty characters that were rated as most neutral and least familiar. Participating labs were instructed to further pretest these twenty characters onsite in order to identify the nine characters that are most neutral and least familiar to participants at that specific lab. The two characters that (a) were most neutral and least familiar, and (b) which differed least in valence and familiarity served as CSs (see [osf.io/a3qj9](https://osf.io/a3qj9/) for the results of the pretest conducted at each lab). One lab (Gawronski) was unable to carry out such a pretest and therefore used the nine characters derived from the online initial pretest.

**Filler and target stimuli**. The seven characters not selected during the pre-testing phase to serve as CSs (*see above*) served as target and filler stimuli. Finally, six neutral words (*Book*, *Concrete*, *Umbrella*, *Pencils*, *Glasses*, *Computer*) and four neutral IAPS images served as filler stimuli. The original authors did not provide us with filler items and we had to therefore select these items and have them approved by those authors.

## Procedure

Participants completed four tasks in fixed order (surveillance task, filler task, evaluation task, post-experiment questionnaire) and did so in their native language (see [osf.io/6n4fv/](https://osf.io/6n4fv/) for a screen capture video of the experiment in English). The assignment of CS to US valence was counterbalanced between participants. Each CS appeared once with each of the 20 USs of the same valence.

**Surveillance task.** The surveillance task consisted of 5 blocks, each containing a differenttarget stimulus. Each block comprised of 86 trials, each presented for 1500ms with no inter-trial interval. Each block included 8 CS-US pair trials (4 CS-USpos trials and 4 CS-USneg trials), 10 target trials, 30 blank screen trials, and 38 fillers trials. In all cases (except for blank screen trials) one or two stimuli were presented on-screen. Each CS-US pair was preceded and followed by a blank screen trial, and these ‘triplets’ were fixed at various positions throughout the procedure (10-12, 20-22, 30-32, 40-42, 50-52, 60-62, 70-72, 80-82, with an alternation between the CSpos and CSneg). The assignment of CS-US pairs to the fixed positions occurred randomly. As recommended by Jones et al. (2009), the CS and the US were presented close to one another (approximately 1cm from each other) and the CS was always larger than the US. In each block, target trials, filler trials, and 14 blank screen trials were presented randomly in the remaining locations (see [osf.io/wnckg](https://osf.io/wnckg/) for a detailed overview of trial content).

Prior to the surveillance task participants read the following instructions:

*“Imagine that you are a security guard watching for deviant activity at a business. Your job requires that you pay attention at all times, and respond quickly when something suspicious happens. In our lab we study attention and rapid responding, and in this experiment you’ll be asked to play the role of the security guard.*

*Specifically, you will be attending to a number of items presented on the computer screen, and you’ll be responding as quickly as possible when a target item appears by pressing the spacebar. The target item will appear at random several times throughout the experiment. The target item may appear as an image or as a name. So be sure to pay attention at all times and focus on the screen, because you never know when the target item will appear. A number of filler items that we’ve selected from our stimulus pool will also be shown randomly to make the task more challenging. These distractors are both pictures and words that were just randomly picked from our collection.*

*Sometimes two images will appear on the screen at the same time, and sometimes only one image will appear. Be sure to hit the spacebar only when the target appears. The target might appear anywhere on the screen as well, and it might also appear with other images. So whenever you see a target image or name anywhere on the screen, hit the spacebar.*

*The items will be displayed rapidly, so make sure that when you see a target, you hit the spacebar before it disappears. Again, be sure to pay close attention throughout the experiment so that you can respond as quickly and accurately as possible.*

*There will be five separate surveillance tasks of about 4 minutes each. Each task will have a different target, and all of the target items will be cartoon creatures.”*

**Filler task.** Although a filler task was not used in the original (2001) study nor in the vast majority of published surveillance task studies (4 of the 23 studies in our meta-analysis), the original authors recommended that we add a filler task in order to create a delay between the surveillance task and the evaluation task (e.g., Kendrick & Olson, 2012). The filler task included two questionnaires: the Need for Cognition scale (18-item NFC Scale: Cacioppo et al., 1984) and the Need to Evaluate scale (16-item NFE scale: Jarvis & Petty, 1996), presented in a fixed order (NFC followed by NFE). These tasks are not central to the main hypotheses and were therefore not analyzed. Nevertheless, those interested in this data can retrieve it from the OSF website ([osf.io/k9nrf](https://osf.io/k9nrf/)).

**Evaluation task.** Following the filler task, participants completed a 30-trial forced-choice task (Jones et al., 2009). On each trial, a pair of stimuli was presented onscreen and participants indicated as quickly as possible which image they prefer by pressing a corresponding key. Ten of the trials presented one or both CSs (two presented the CSpos and CSneg together, four presented the CSpos with one of the neutral targets/fillers, and four presented CSneg with one of the neutral targets/fillers[[4]](#footnote-5)). The remaining 20 trials were filler trials, each presenting two neutral targets/fillers. Two filler trials always preceded the first critical trial, and subsequent critical trials appeared at fixed points separated by filler trials (positions 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 24, 27 and 30). The ten critical trials were randomly assigned to the fixed positions.

Participants saw the following instructions:

*“Next, you’ll be presented with 30 pairs of target and filler creatures from the surveillance tasks, and we’d like you to indicate which one you like better. You don’t need a reason for liking one rather than the other, just give us your gut feelings. We are interested in knowing if the pleasantness or unpleasantness of these stimuli affects the ability to attend and rapidly respond to them, so we need you to indicate which you prefer. Remember, you don’t need a reason for liking one rather than the other, so just go with your gut. Please respond quickly.”*

**Post-experiment questionnaire**. After the evaluation task, participants completed a questionnaire: we used the original Olson and Fazio (2001) post-experiment questionnaire followed by the questionnaire used in the studies of Bar-Anan et al. (2010). With respect to the former, participants first answered three open-ended questions: 1. *Think back to the very first part of the experiment. Did you notice anything out of the ordinary in the way the words and pictures were presented during the surveillance tasks?* 2. *Did you notice anything systematic about how particular words and images appeared together during the surveillance tasks?* 3. *Did you notice anything about the words and images that appeared with certain cartoon creatures?* Although the original authors recommended that we collect data for all three questions, they also recommended that we only use the first two questions when assessing awareness.

With respect to the Bar-Anan et al. (2010) protocol, participants were asked the following three questions: *1. For some participants, during the first task, there was one cartoon creature that always appeared with positive images and words, and one that always appeared with negative images and words. Do you think it happened in your case?* (response options: No, I did not notice if that happened in my task, Yes, that happened in my task*). 2. During the first task, which of the two characters was consistently presented with positive images and words? 3. During the first task, which of the two characters was consistently presented with negative images and words?* (response options to questions 2 and 3: CSpos (certainly), CSpos (probably), CSpos (guess), CSneg (guess), CSneg (probably), CSneg (certainly). Finally, we assessed familiarity with the Pokémon presented in the task: How familiar were you with the cartoon creatures that appeared in the surveillance tasks? (response scale: 0 = Not familiar at all to 8 = Very familiar).

**Experimental fidelity.** We took a number of steps in order to maximize experimental fidelity across labs. First, given differences in the native languages of participating labs (e.g., Dutch, German, Spanish, French, Polish), materials originally produced in English were translated. We did so using a forward and backward translation process. Specifically, materials were first translated from English into the native language used at a given lab by one member of that participating team. This translation was then backward translated into English by another member of that same team who was not involved in the initial translation process. This backward translation was returned to the coordinating team for verification and approval. When necessary (i.e., where the backward translation was not approved) the translation process was repeated until approval was provided. Second, the entire experimental protocol was standardized across all labs. Specifically, each lab ran the experiment using the same program and general materials (i.e., developed in PsychoPy; Peirce, [2007](https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/02699930903485076)), which generated identically formatted raw data files across all sites. We then collated these data files from all sites and analyzed them centrally using a single set of R code and scripts.

# Results

## Data processing

**Surveillance task**. We computed the number of errors made during the surveillance task for each participant (errors are defined as responding to non-target trials, or not responding to target trials), to check if participants paid attention during that task. Based on the original authors’ recommendations, we excluded participants who were more than three standard deviations above or below the mean number of errors, as in the original Olson and Fazio (2001) study. 2% of participants were excluded on this basis.

**Evaluation task**. Following Jones et al. (2009), a *self-reported preference score* was calculated for each participant based on their performance during the evaluation task. Specifically, a score of 1 was assigned to trials in which the participant chose the CSpos or the image that appeared together with CSneg. A score of −1 was assigned to trials in which participants chose the CSneg or the image appearing together with CSpos. The sum of this coding,which ranged from -10 to +10 served as a measure of evaluative responding (i.e., a preference for CSpos over CSneg).

**Awareness/recollection memory criteria.** Four methods of excluding individuals based on their responses to the post-experiment questions were preregistered. Although they were all preregistered, we refer to them as primary versus secondary analyses in order to separate the method that most closely resembled that employed by the original authors in their study (Olson & Fazio, 2001), from three additional methods to explore the robustness of the effect. These secondary criteria were included because they had either been (a) used in previously published work (Bar-Anan et al., 2010), or (b) were created by us in order to provide different levels of stringency than previously employed (i.e., higher than Olson & Fazio, 2001 and lower than the Bar-Anan et al., 2010, respectively).[[5]](#footnote-6)

The exact instructions provided to the data collection sites for the ‘Olson and Fazio (2001)’ and ‘Olson and Fazio (2001) modified’ criteria can be found at [osf.io/2dm6u](https://osf.io/2dm6u/). Data processing for the ‘Bar-Anan et al. (2010)’ and ‘Bar-Anan et al. (2010) modified’ criteria required no hand scoring and were performed algorithmically (see [osf.io/k9nrf](https://osf.io/k9nrf/) for R script). The details of the four exclusion criteria methods is provided below. Note that question 3 from the original post-experiment questionnaire and the question about the familiarity of the Pokémon (listed previously) were included in the protocol on the behest of the original authors but, following our preregistered analytic strategy, were not used by any of the awareness criteria.

***Primary criterion: Olson and Fazio (2001).*** We first computed a score following the original authors’ recommendations to closely replicate their original study. This score was based on participants’ open-ended responses to the original Olson and Fazio’s post-experiment question 1 (*Think back to the very first part of the experiment. Did you notice anything out of the ordinary in the way the words and pictures were presented during the surveillance tasks?*) and the original Olson and Fazio’s post-experiment question 2 (*Did you notice anything systematic about how particular words and images appeared together during the surveillance tasks?*). Two independent raters, who were blinded to one another’s ratings, evaluated responses to these two questions, and treated the responses given to both questions as one (compound) text response. Specifically, they scored participants as being ‘aware’ if their responses to either of these two questions made correct reference to *both* of the CS-US pairings. In other words, they were scored as ‘aware’ if they wrote that CSpos (either its name or a description of its appearance) appeared during the task together with positively valenced words/images *and* that CSneg (its name or a description of its appearance) appeared during the task together with negative words/images. If they failed to meet this criterion for any reason then they were scored as ‘unaware’. This included (a) identifying only one of the two CS-US pairings, (b) identifying the CS-US pairings incorrectly (i.e., reversed), (c) identifying that the two CS were paired with US stimuli but not specifying which was paired with which, or (d) not identifying CS-US pairings at all. Scores were then compared between raters to assign each participant a single score. Participants were only scored as ‘aware’ if they were scored by both raters as being ‘aware’.

***Secondary criteria.*** We considered that the original authors’ criterion may have scored individuals who were actually aware of/remembered the contingencies as ‘unaware’. Therefore we preregistered three additional secondary exclusion criteria that allowed us to examine if evidence for EC effects in this task were robust to or depended on the specific way in which contingency awareness/recollective memory was measured.

*Criterion 2 (Olson & Fazio 2001 modified).* This criterion was identical to the Olson and Fazio (2001) criterion with one modification: participants were scored as ‘aware’ if their responses to the two questions referred to *any form of systematic pairing* between theCS and US stimuli, regardless of whether specific pairings were described. Specifically, participants were coded as “aware” if they (a) identified only one of the two CS-US pairings, (b) identified the CS-US pairings incorrectly (i.e., reversed), (c) identified that the two CS were paired with US stimuli but not specifying the specific way in which the CSs and USs were paired. Participants were coded as “unaware” only if their answer did not contain any mention of a systematic pairing between CSs and USs. In cases of disagreement between the two raters, the participant’s responses were scored by a third rater. The participant was scored as ‘aware’ or ‘unaware’ based on the majority judgment.

*Criterion 3 (Bar-Anan et al., 2010).* This criterion was computed based on Bar-Anan et al.’s (2010) criterion. Here participants were asked: *For some participants, during the first task, there was one cartoon creature that always appeared with positive images and words, and one that always appeared with negative images and words. Do you think it happened in your case?* (Question 1 from the Bar-Anan et al. protocol). They were scored as ‘aware’ if they responded “Yes, that happened in my task” and as unaware if they chose “No, I did not notice if that happened in my task”.

*Criterion 4 (Bar-Anan et al., 2010 modified).* This criterion was identical to the Bar-Anan et al., (2010) criterion with the addition that participants had to correctly identify (on post-experiment questions 2 and 3 from the Bar-Anan et al. protocol) the valence of the USs with which each of the two CSs appeared. Specifically, post-experiment questions 2 and 3 from the Bar-Anan et al. protocol presented participants with images of the two CSs and asked them the following: *During the first task, which of the two characters was consistently presented with [positive/negative] images and words?* Response options were, for example, “BERGMITE (certainly)”, “BERGMITE (probably)”, “BERGMITE (guess)”, “PALPITOAD (guess)”, “PALPITOAD  (probably)”, “PALPITOAD (certainly)”). Note that the specific Pokémon exemplars used in the questions depended on those used at each laboratory. Participants were scored as ‘aware’ if they identified the correct CS that was paired with the US *and* used either the “probably” or “certainly” response options when doing so (i.e., not the “guess” option). All other participants were scored as ‘unaware’.



**Figure 2.** Results of the preregistered meta-analysis models. Primary model: (a) exclusions based on the original authors’ criterion (Olson & Fazio, 2001); secondary models: exclusions based on the (b) Olson & Fazio (2001) modified, (c) Bar-Anan et al. (2010) and (d) Bar-Anan et al. (2010) modified criteria. DV was Evaluative Conditioning effect score (i.e., a preference for CSpos over CSneg). Each lab is identified by the last name of the corresponding author. In each forest plot, squares represent observed Hedges’ *g* effect sizes, size of square represents weighting in the model (i.e., inverse variance), and error bars represent 95% Confidence Intervals (CIs) around the effect size. The bottom row in the figure is the outcome of a random-effects meta-analysis. No credibility intervals beyond the confidence intervals are visible due to no between site heterogeneity being observed. Estimates of heterogeneity (*I*2 and *H*2) are provided next to the meta-analysis model results. Restricted Maximum Likelihood estimation was used for all models.

## Preregistered analyses

In each analysis, to determine whether EC effects emerged in the absence of contingency awareness/recollective memory, we first excluded participants who were scored as ‘aware’ according to an awareness exclusion criterion, and then computed an EC effect size (Hedges’ *g*) for each site from the mean and standard deviation of the self-reported preference score. Thereafter we meta-analyzed these effect sizes using an alpha value of 0.05 (two-sided). Although all labs used similar materials, they may nevertheless differ in the translation of materials, selection of stimuli, or characteristics of the samples. In order to account for this within the analyses, we employed random effects meta-analysis models with a random intercept for data collection site. All analyses were conducted using the R package ‘metafor’ (Viechtbauer, 2010) and used Restricted Maximum Likelihood estimation.

***Primary analyses.*** The meta-analysis based on the Olson and Fazio (2001) awareness criterion (i.e., most closely replicating the original study; *n* = 1340, 9.2% excluded) showed that, on average, the surveillance task led to a small but significant EC effect, Hedges’ *g* = 0.12, 95% CI [0.05, 0.20], *z* = 3.17, *p* = .002, in the expected direction. Effect sizes ranged from -0.02 to 0.31 across labs (see Figure 2, panel ‘a’). Variation in effect sizes between sites was consistent with what one would expect by chance (i.e., due to sampling variation alone), τ2 = 0.0, *I*2 = 0.0%, *H*2 = 1.0, *Q*(11) = 5.83, *p* = .885. In sum, when the original authors’ awareness exclusion criterion was employed, their original effect was replicated.

***Secondary analyses.*** Three other meta-analysis models were fitted, one for each of the other three awareness exclusion criteria, in order to understand the robustness of the EC effect under other exclusion criteria. When a modified version of the original authors’ exclusion criterion was applied (i.e., Olson & Fazio, 2001 modified, *n* = 1007, 31.9% excluded), the surveillance task was not found to produce an EC effect, Hedges’ *g* = 0.05, 95% CI [-0.04, 0.13], *z* = 1.04, *p* = .299. Effect sizes ranged from -0.08 to 0.30 between sites (see Figure 2, panel ‘b’). Variation in effect sizes between sites was consistent with what one would expect by chance, τ2 = 0.0, *I*2 = 0.0%, *H*2 = 1.0, *Q*(11) = 2.76, *p* = .994.

When the Bar-Anan et al. (2010) exclusion criterion was applied (*n* = 755, 48.9% excluded), the surveillance task once again did not lead to an EC effect, Hedges’ *g* = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.06, 0.13], *z* = 0.69, *p* = .493. Effect sizes ranged from -0.24 to 0.18 between sites (see Figure 2, panel ‘c’). Variation in effect sizes between sites was consistent with what one would expect by chance, τ2 = 0.0, *I*2 = 0.0%, *H*2 = 1.0, *Q*(11) = 4.17, *p* = .965.

When the modified Bar-Anan et al. (2010) criterion was applied (*n* = 1060, 28.3% excluded), the surveillance task also did not lead to an EC effect, Hedges’ *g* = 0.05, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.13], *z* = 1.17, *p* = .241. Effect sizes ranged from -0.16 to 0.19 between sites (see Figure 2, panel ‘d’). Variation in effect sizes between sites was consistent with what one would expect by chance, τ2 = 0.0, *I*2 = 0.0%, *H*2 = 1.0, *Q*(11) = 3.45, *p* = .983.

Finally, to investigate whether the effect sizes computed based on the four awareness/recollective memory criteria differ from one another, we combined the datasets used in all of the above analyses into one and used a multilevel meta-analysis with the awareness exclusion criterion as a moderator. A random intercept for data collection site was included to account for the statistical dependency between effect sizes coming from related samples. The moderator test did not demonstrate evidence that the results of the four criteria differed from each other, *Q*(3) = 2.76, *p* = .430.

Although we obtained an EC effect when using the original authors’ (Olson & Fazio, 2001) awareness exclusion criterion, no such EC effects were found when any of the other three alternative exclusion criteria were employed. Of course, the difference between significant and non-significant is not itself significant (Gelman & Stern, 2006): as such, it is important to also note the non-significant effect of exclusion criteria type in the multilevel moderator meta-analysis. As such, while it is correct to say that a significant EC effect was found for only the primary Olson and Fazio (2001) criterion and not the other three secondary criteria, we also cannot conclude that EC effects in the surveillance task depend on or differ between the specific way in which contingency awareness/recollective memory is measured.

**Comparison of ‘contingency-aware’ vs. ‘unaware’ participants.** In all previous analyses, ‘contingency-aware’ participants were excluded. Yet one could also examine whether awareness/recollective memory moderate the size of EC effects. With this in mind, we divided participants into two groups (‘aware’ and ‘unaware’) using the four aforementioned criteria, and then carried out an additional set of secondary analyses that compared EC effects between these two groups using a multilevel moderator meta-analysis model. Note however that the results obtained from such a comparison should be interpreted with extreme caution. Previous research has argued that it is conceptually and statistically problematic to use one outcome measure as a moderator of another outcome measure, due to the correlational nature of their relation (e.g., Gawronski & Walther, 2012). More broadly, caution is warranted in the interpretation of all analyses, given that any attempt to detect differences in EC effects between putatively ‘aware’ and ‘unaware’ participants will ultimately depend on the reliability of the awareness measure used, and of the EC procedure itself (Shanks, 2017). Previous evidence suggests that unconscious learning paradigms and awareness tests tend to yield unreliable measures (e.g., Vadillo et al., 2020).

Whereas the previous meta-analyses examined whether EC effects were found in ‘unaware’ participants, the following analyses examined whether EC effects differed between those who were ‘aware’ versus ‘unaware’. In each case between the different awareness exclusion criteria, rather than excluding participants based on a given awareness criterion, all participants were instead included and that criterion was employed as a moderator in the meta-analysis. We did so in order to examine if the ‘contingency-aware’ participants excluded in previous analyses produced higher or lower EC effects than their ‘contingency-unaware’ counterparts. All moderator analyses reported in this section included a random intercept for data collection site in order to account for the dependencies between effect sizes coming from the same experimental setting. In each case, we report only the difference between the two conditions (i.e., moderation test) and the effect size in the ‘aware’ group (effect sizes in the ‘unaware’ groups can be found in the previous meta-analyses).

First, participants classified as ‘aware’ according to the Olson and Fazio (2001) criterion showed a small EC effect, Hedges’ *g* = 0.30, 95% CI [0.04, 0.56], *z* = 2.23, *p* = .026. Results from the moderator test did not provide evidence that EC effects differed between ‘aware’ and ‘unaware’ participants, *Q*(1) = 1.59, *p* = .207. Second, participants classified as ‘aware’ according to the modified Olson and Fazio (2001) criterion showed a small EC effect, Hedges’ *g* = 0.33, 95% CI [0.20, 0.46], *z* = 5.01, *p* < .001. The moderator test demonstrated that EC effects differed between ‘aware’ and ‘unaware’ participants, *Q*(1) = 12.90, *p* < .001. Third, participants classified as ‘aware’ according to the original Bar-Anan et al. (2010) criterion showed a small EC effect, Hedges’ *g* = 0.24, 95% CI [0.14, 0.35], *z* = 4.60, *p* < .001. The moderator test demonstrated that EC effects differed between ‘aware’ and ‘unaware’ participants, *Q*(1) = 8.10, *p* = .004. Finally, participants classified as ‘aware’ according to the modified Bar-Anan et al. (2010) criterion showed a medium EC effect, Hedges’ *g* = 0.37, 95% CI [0.23, 0.51], *z* = 5.24, *p* < .001. The moderator test demonstrated that EC effects differed between ‘aware’ and ‘unaware’ participants, *Q*(1) = 14.94, *p* < .001.

We hypothesized that EC effects would be larger for contingency-aware than for contingency-unaware participants. We obtained support for this hypothesis when the three secondary exclusion criteria were applied (Olson & Fazio, 2001 modified; Bar-Anan et al., 2010, and Bar-Anan et al., 2010 modified) and failed to obtain support for it when the original authors’ criterion (Olson & Fazio, 2001) was applied. Once again, and as discussed previously, the results of this analysis should be interpreted with caution.

## Non-preregistered analyses

**Power analyses.** Given our larger sample sizes, multi-site data collection, and use of preregistration, we believe that the effect sizes obtained in this study represent more precise estimates of the true effect size and have lower risk of bias than the published literature. Using the effect size found in the primary analysis and the sample sizes reported in the published literature, the observed power of the original Olson and Fazio (2001) study was extremely low (observed power = .13, one-sample, alpha = 0.05, two-sided), as is the observed power for the published literature more generally (median power = .14, MAD = .14, range = .07 to .75). This is far lower than the typically endorsed minimum of power ≥ .80 (Cohen, 1992), and out of step with the proportion of published studies that reported significant results (48%).

Using the observed effect sizes, we calculated *a priori* sample sizes for future research, using both the largest meta-effect size found among the four exclusion criteria (i.e., Olson & Fazio, 2001 criterion: *g* = 0.12) and the smallest (i.e., Bar-Anan et al., 2010 criterion: *g* = 0.03). To achieve 80% power, *n* > 547 to 8723 participants would be required, respectively, depending on which meta-effect size is used. To achieve 95% power, *n* > 905 to 14,441 participants would be required, respectively. Finally, we calculated the probability of observing an effect within a sample size that is typically manageable for a single lab to collect (i.e., 150 participants: the upper bound of the recommended sample size we asked each site to collect for this article). Power analyses suggested the probability of observing an effect (i.e., power) using a sample size of *n* = 150 was 30.9% to 6.5% respectively, depending on which meta-effect size estimate was used.

**Moderator meta-analysis.** After data collection and analysis, a co-author pointed out that the assumption of independence was violated within our moderator meta-analysis, given that two of the exclusion criteria (Olson & Fazio, 2001 modified and Bar-Anan et al., 2010 modified) are derivatives of the other two (Olson & Fazio, 2001 and Bar-Anan et al., 2010). In order to ensure that this violation did not influence conclusions, we fitted one additional model. This was identical to the moderator meta-analysis model with one exception: instead of treating the criteria as one variable with four levels, it treated them as two: criterion ‘family’ (i.e., Olson & Fazio type vs. Bar-Anan et al. type) and ‘strictness’ (i.e., one of the two within each family was stricter than the other). These two variables and their interaction were included as moderators in the meta-analysis model. Consistent with the results of the preregistered moderator meta-analysis model, no evidence of moderation was found either overall, *Q*(3) =2.76, *p* = .430, or for the change in meta effect sizes for family, strictness, or their interaction, all *p*s ≥ .205.

# Discussion

Over the past twenty years effects on the surveillance task have been treated as evidence for attitude formation in the absence of awareness/recollective memory. This claim has fed theories about EC and attitudes, as well as interventions that are assumed to ‘implicitly’ modify problematic beliefs and behavior. Yet strong claims regarding ‘unaware EC’ necessitate strong evidence. In this replication attempt, our *primary* analysis examined whether an effect was produced on the surveillance task when the original Olson and Fazio (2001) awareness exclusion criterion was used. We also conducted (preregistered) *secondary* analyses into whether the effect was robust under three other criteria.

Our primary analysis using Olson and Fazio’s (2001) original exclusion criterion demonstrated a small but significant EC effect on the surveillance task. We therefore replicated their effect, in the sense that significant results were found in both studies. However, it is worth noting that no EC effect emerged when any of the other three alternative awareness exclusion criteria were applied. To complicate matters further, EC effects did not differ significantly between these four criteria. This poses a challenge in how to make a global interpretation of effects that (a) fall on either side of the significant versus non-significant divide, and yet (b) cannot be distinguished from one another.

The ‘success’ of a replication can also be defined in other ways that may aid the interpretation of the results. Previous large-scale replication efforts in psychology have noted a marked decrease in the effect sizes observed between original and replication studies (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). We observed a similar result here: even the largest meta-analytic effect size we observed among the four exclusion criteria (*g* = 0.12 using the Olson & Fazio, 2001 exclusion criterion) was approximately half that observed in the meta-analysis of published literature (*g* = 0.20) and less than half of that observed in the original study (*g* = 0.27). Results demonstrated that observed power in the published literature is therefore extremely low (median power = 0.14). Together, these two points suggest the published literature on the surveillance task reports significant results at a rate far above what one should expect in the absence of publication bias or selective reporting.

Further reasons for caution can be found in the ‘awareness/recollection memory’ concept itself. Debate continues to rage about what such exclusion criteria even capture: some argue that it is ‘awareness’ (Jones et al., 2009) whereas others advocate for ‘recollective memory’ (Gawronski & Walther, 2012). For example, participants may be aware of pairings during the acquisition (EC) phase but fail to recall this information during the retrieval (evaluative) phase. Although our primary analysis demonstrated that Olson and Fazio’s (2001) surveillance task effect was replicated, these conceptual concerns raise questions as to whether this procedure represents a useful test of the unaware EC hypothesis. This further reinforces the need for caution when deriving theoretical claims and applied interventions based on *post hoc* correlational designs, and the added value of experimental manipulations of the construct of interest (e.g., see Corneille & Stahl, 2019).

To conclude, although we replicated the surveillance task effect, we urge caution when using such an effect to make strong claims about ‘unaware EC’, especially when those claims are being used to justify *new* theory and interventions. We also encourage more careful reflection on existing theory and interventions that have already been founded on this effect (e.g., March et al., 2018; Shaw et al., 2016). Strong claims necessitate strong evidence; evidence that we are currently lacking.

# Author contributions

TM led the project administration, conducted the meta-analysis of published work, created the procedure protocol, was responsible for design of the materials, wrote the manuscript, contributed to data collection, and reviewed the code for the data processing and analyses. SH wrote the manuscript and contributed to project administration. IH wrote the code for the materials, data processing, and analyses, and contributed to project administration, and writing, reviewing, and editing the manuscript. MAV contributed to the meta-analysis of published work, and to writing the original draft, the analyses, and reviewing and editing the final manuscript. MAO contributed to the creation of the procedure protocol, data collection and review of the manuscript. FA, KB, RB, TB, OC, SBD, MJF, KAF, AG, BG, TH, FH, MH, BK, AM, JR, JSW, CTS, CS, PT, TGF, KH and CU organized and/or conducted data collection at their sites, and contributed to the review of the manuscript. JDH contributed to the creation of the procedure protocol and review of the manuscript.

# Funding

This research was conducted with the support of the following grants: FWO grant BOF16/MET\_V/002 to Jan De Houwer, Ghent University BOF grant 01P05517 to Ian Hussey, Comunidad de Madrid, Programa de Atracción de Talento Investigador grants PSI2017-85159-P (AEI / FEDER, UE) and 2016-T1/SOC-1395 to Miguel Vadillo, and FRS-FNRS grant T.0061.18 to Olivier Corneille.

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1. The planned minimum sample size after 30% exclusions had 99% power to detect Cohen’s *d* of 0.13 and 80% power to detect Cohen’s *d* of 0.08 (within subjects, one tailed, alpha = 0.05). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. This was the lab of one of the original authors (Olson). Given that we wanted to offer this lab the opportunity to fully participate in this replication effort, we updated our preregistration with an extended deadline for data collection at this site and specified that all data from all sites would be included regardless of sample size (see [osf.io/uyng7](https://osf.io/uyng7) for the addition to the preregistration, and Supplementary Online Materials – Reviewed for deviations from original preregistration). This choice was deemed compatible with our meta-analytic approach. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. The original authors also recommended that we use mildly evocative stimuli in our replication attempt. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. The same four natural targets/fillers appeared with CSpos and CSneg. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. Note that our preregistration and Stage 1 accepted manuscript originally referred to these as ‘confirmatory’ vs. ‘exploratory’ analyses rather than ‘primary’ vs. ‘secondary’. However, this terminology was deemed to be at odds with the fact that both were preregistered, and therefore potentially confusing for the reader. This and all other divergences from preregistration are documented in the Supplementary Online Materials – Reviewed. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)